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“There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets 
depends on the amount of money he has.” 
- United States Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black1 
I.  Introduction – The Background Story 
The legal saga started exactly eight years earlier, in June 2003, when a 
South Carolina family court judge ordered Michael Turner to pay $51.73 a 
week to Rebecca Rogers to help support their child.2  During the following 
three years, Turner was held in contempt five different times for failure to 
pay the support payment;3  “the first four times he was sentenced to ninety 
days’ imprisonment but he ultimately paid the amount due.”4 
The fifth time he completed a six-month sentence, after which the 
court clerk issued a “show cause” order to him on March 27, 2006.5  After 
the original hearing for this order was rescheduled because of Turner’s 
failure to appear came the hearing specifically under review in the case at 
hand.6  There, the court clerk told Turner that he was $5,728.76 behind in 
child support payment, and the judge then asked Turner if he had anything 
to say.7  To this, Turner explained that he had missed prior payments 
because of drugs and an injury, but that he was now sober and sorry about 
                                                                                                     
 1. Peter Edelman, When Second Best Is the Best We Can Do: Improving the Odds for 
Pro Se Civil Litigants, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 9 (June 2011), http://www. 
americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/06/pdf/secondbest.pdf. 
 2. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2011) (revealing how the family’s 
legal case started). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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all of the failures to pay.8  The judge responded “okay,” asked if Rogers had 
anything to say, briefly explained federal benefits, and then stated that he 
found Turner in contempt, sentencing him to a year in prison or until he had 
a zero balance on his account.9  He would, however, allow Turner to be 
available for work release if he had a job.10  The judge thus never made an 
express finding of Turner’s ability to pay, although according to the 
procedures set, this was something that he should have determined.11  
Turner appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, 
which affirmed by noting simply that Turner’s situation involves civil, not 
criminal, contempt, and thus it does not require as many constitutional 
safeguards.12  Turner once again appealed this decision, and the Supreme 
Court decided to take up the case.13 
II.  The Legal Ramifications of the Decision 
A.  Overview of the Case’s Legal Significance 
The case of Turner v. Rogers14 was significant for both the issue at 
stake and its surprising holding.15  Generally, Associate Justice Stephen G. 
Breyer, writing for the United States Supreme Court, decreed that indigents 
in contempt of child support orders, who can receive up to one year in jail 
                                                                                                     
 8. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2011) (revealing how the family’s 
legal case started). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. at 2513–14 (showing that the court did not appropriately follow due 
process procedure). 
 12. See id. at 2516 (“Consequently, the Court has made clear (in a case not involving 
the right to counsel) that, where civil contempt is at issue, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause allows a State to provide fewer procedural protections than in a criminal 
case.”). 
 13. See id. at 2514 (explaining how the case was brought before the United States 
Supreme Court). 
 14. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2011) (holding that child support 
contemnors are not guaranteed a right to counsel in cases where they receive a sentence of 
up to a year in jail, when the opposing party is also unrepresented). 
 15. See Mark Walsh, A Sour Note from Gideon’s Trumpet, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 1, 
2011, 3:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_sour_note_from_gideons 
_trumpet/ (explaining that the outcome in the case “prompted a robust discussion” about the 
critical question of the case, as well as about the basic human rights that were implicated). 
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for failure to comply, and who are opposed by a custodial parent without 
counsel, do not have a right to counsel as long as four procedural 
safeguards are in place.16   
With so many qualifiers, it is easy to overlook the Supreme Court’s 
decision as of no consequence.17  But, the truth is that many American 
families are in child support arrangements where Turner would apply.18  
And in these circumstances, how the case is resolved is highly significant 
for the quality of life that the family members will afterwards lead.19  An 
Urban Institute study shows that “child support reduces the number of poor 
children by a half million and lessens income inequality among children 
eligible for it,” but yet, “about 70 percent of poor children eligible for child 
support were not getting it in 1996.”20  This point was further highlighted in 
the amicus curiae brief that United States Senators Jim DeMint, Lindsey 
Graham, Mike Johanns, and Marco Rubio filed for the respondents, where 
they admitted that those on Capitol Hill realize that  “failure to pay child 
support is a major problem that inflicts tremendous social and financial 
costs on custodial parents and children.”21 Finally, as shown in one South 
Carolina case study, in child contempt cases the defendant is jailed about 
95% of the time.22  Thus, while judges may be jaded by the wealth of these 
cases on their dockets, how they view the parties and weigh the evidence—
                                                                                                     
 16. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (restating the holding in the 
case). 
 17. See Walsh, supra note 15 (relating that the news picked up the Wal-Mart sex 
discrimination case, decided the same day, instead of Turner v. Rogers). 
 18. See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support 
Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 97 (2008) 
(explaining that there are many child support contemnors in America). 
 19. See Elaine Sorenson & Chava Zibman, Child Support Offers Some Protection 
Against Poverty, URBAN INSTITUTE (Mar.15, 2000), http://www.urban.org/publications/ 
309440.html (showing the impact that contempt cases have on the basic human needs of the 
parties). 
 20. Id. (showing that the outcome of these proceedings has a large impact on the 
financial arrangements for a child). 
 21. Brief for Senator Jim Demint et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10–10) (stating the senators conceded that 
politicians in Congress are aware of this important aspect of the case, citing Senators Kohl 
and Rockefeller as saying that child support payments are “a much-needed ‘lifeline’ for 
custodial parents”). 
 22. Jacquelyn L. Boggess, Child Support: Ability to Pay and Incarceration, CENTER 
FOR FAMILY POLICY AND PRACTICE (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.cffpp.org/ 
publications/Turner%20Brief.pdf (citing a case study in the state where Turner v. Rogers 
originated). 
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what was decided in Turner—can be truly life changing for both parties.23  
When such disputes do arise, the proceedings may very well end with jail 
time for one of the parties, or result in the other sending his or her child to 
bed hungry for another night.24  The case is also important for the continued 
functioning of the legal system; the civil rights of due process and 
government enforcement are undeniably implicated.25  Thus, Turner does 
not concern trivial matters and it is worth some scrutiny.26 
B.  Note Outline 
A reflection of the Court’s holding and reasoning in the case raises a 
number of concerns, primarily because it is not clear from civil right-to-
counsel case law (a so-called civil Gideon case law), general contempt case 
law, or jurisprudence that the Court should have denied a right to counsel 
for indigent child support contemnors.27  Due to the wealth of support in 
favor of such a proposition, in fact, the Note will then examine “the 
elephant in the room” to understand a possible reason for why the justices 
decided to steer civil Gideon in another direction—that “elephant” being 
practicality.28 Upon examination of the current legal justice system, 
particularly of Sixth Amendment criminal right to counsel, and of various 
states’ attempts at providing civil Gideon entitlement to counsel in such 
family law cases, there is an unstated, but not to be overlooked, 
                                                                                                     
 23. See id. (showing that these court opinions are a factor in whether or not a child 
grows up poor). 
 24. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (showing that Turner faced up 
to a year in jail for failing to comply with the contempt order);  Brief of Elizabeth G. 
Patterson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 30–1, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 
2507 (2011) (No. 10–10) (clarifying that payment failures result in numerous and significant 
negative effects for the custodial family). 
 25. See generally id. (showing how the Supreme Court centers its discussion on the 
rights that the contemnors have under the Due Process Clause in order to ensure they have 
valid due process before government enforcement). 
 26. See id. at 2520;  Brief of the Respondents at 2–3, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 
2507 (2011) (No. 10–10) (summarily indicating that the stakes are high for both sides, even 
though it is a seemingly simple family law case).  
 27. See Brief for Legal Aid Soc’y of the District of Columbia et al. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Turner v. Rogers 131 S.Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10) (showing that 
amicus curiae believed that the Supreme Court already had on-point cases that it would use). 
 28. See infra notes 154–69 and accompanying text (considering how the Supreme 
Court justices handled application of the Sixth Amendment to civil Gideon). 
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conclusion.29  The American legal justice system would have been crippled 
by a decision allowing for civil Gideon in such cases.30  The Note will 
move from the Court’s analysis to its mandate—the four procedural 
safeguards that the majority directs all state courts to implement instead of 
civil Gideon.  The author hopes to explain why the Court should not have 
included mandatory safeguards and how they are unhelpful for ensuring 
protection of civil rights in this family law context.31  Finally, the Note will 
conclude with alternative solutions to the one that the Supreme Court chose, 
and a preview of how Turner v. Rogers will be implemented in practice.32 
III.  The Fundamental Civil Rights Implicated by the Outcome 
A.  The Rights of the Contemnor 
In child support contempt cases, both parties have pressing civil rights 
concerns.33 Additionally, both sides are likely to have limited or no 
resources, and often times they are members of historically disadvantaged 
groups who may not safely assume that they receive just treatment by the 
government.34  For example, a study done for the New York State Senate on 
local and state civil Gideon programs repeatedly noted that there are myriad 
reasons in favor of a civil Gideon, citing statistics showing that New 
Yorkers may not adequately be able to represent themselves when “two-
                                                                                                     
 29. See Jonathan David Kelley, Gideon’s Bullhorn: Sounding a Louder, Clearer Call 
for a Civil Right to Counsel (Nov. 20, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178813 (explaining 
that prior decrees for right to counsel has essentially been meaningless). 
 30. See id. (theorizing that civil application of Gideon would not be practical for the 
same reasons that criminal applications of Gideon lack quality and overburden the criminal 
justice system). 
 31. See infra notes 170–88 and accompanying text (explaining why the author and the 
legal aid community are skeptical that the safeguards will usher in any meaningful reform). 
 32. See infra notes 189–271 and accompanying text (predicting how the safeguards 
will be used by the courts, as well as alternative solutions that the author recommends 
instead of the current safeguards). 
 33. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517–19 (2011) (relating that the plaintiff 
is seeking vindication by the courts of her legal right to payment, while the defendant is 
seeking adequate due process afforded to him under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 34. See Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 24, at 11 (explaining that 
contemnors in such cases often are parents who are deficient in education and life skills, or 
who have chronic physical ailments or mental illnesses); Boggess, supra note 22, at 2 
(explaining that contemnors  are unlikely to be represented by counsel, which doubles their 
chances of being held in contempt). 
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thirds of New York adults receiving public assistance have not completed 
high school . . . [and] 10 percent in NYC lack a ninth-grade education.”35  
Several studies show that a large majority of these parents make less than 
$10,000 a year and 70 percent of the child support arrears owed nationwide 
are expected from parents who had either no quarterly earnings or had 
annual earnings of less than $10,000, with only 4 percent of the debt owed 
by those who earn more than $40,000.36   The Urban Institute focus study in 
California found that 64 percent of the obligors had court orders practically 
beyond their ability to pay.37  The underpinnings of the contemnors’ civil 
rights concern, then, is often a result of overall problems with American 
social justice.38  As explained by an amicus submitted by the Legal Aid 
Society of the District of Columbia et al., “[a]s a practical matter, a 
significant number of low-income parents genuinely are unable to make the 
child support payments required of them, often for reasons that merit 
sympathy rather than scorn.”39  Upon such an examination, it is clear that 
although some contemnors are probably “deadbeat” and truly can pay the 
support, many in the circumstances described supra seem worthy of the 
government’s protection, not punishment.40  
 On the contemnor’s side, at stake is the individual right of liberty 
being taken away only by sufficient due process under the law.41  It would 
seemingly be hard, however, to assure a contemnor that such a right is 
adequately safeguarded when currently, parents who appear in court 
without counsel are held in contempt more than twice as often as parents 
                                                                                                     
 35. IOLA and Civil Legal Services. Task Force, Expanding Gideon: The Right to 
Indigent Civil Representation, N.Y. STATE SENATE (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.ny 
senate.gov/report/expanding-gideon-right-indigent-civil-representation. 
 36. Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 9. 
 37. Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 10. 
 38. See Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 5–6; Boggess, supra note 22, 
at 2 (relating that there are many external factors outside of the defendant’s control, which 
bear on whether the contemnor is able to comply with a court order). 
 39. Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 5. 
 40. See Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 27, at 5–10 (explaining that while 
these people disobeyed the law, they may have no ability to obey or they may be in 
circumstances that make it difficult for them to obey, so due process protection for them 
should not be overlooked on the assumption that they are “bad people”). 
 41. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011) (“The interest in securing that 
freedom, the freedom ‘from bodily restraint,’ lies ‘at the core of the liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause.’ And we have made clear that its threatened loss through legal 
proceedings demands ‘due process protection.’”). 
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who are represented by counsel.42  Such a fact makes it hard to believe that 
the cases are being decided on the merits.43  Additionally, as the Court 
noted in the case, under modern day due process considerations, a 
contemnor is not supposed to be jailed if he truly cannot pay;44 this is a 
debtors’ prison situation that American law diverged from years ago.45  
Thus, meaningful due process is essential to guarantee that cases are 
decided on the merits and that limits are set on the government’s wrath.46 
B.  The Rights of the Custodial Parent and the Child 
On the other side of the courtroom, the custodial parent and the child 
are also concerned about due process, although with a focus on procedural 
due process as they are seeking vindication.47  The plaintiff is not concerned 
with deprivation of liberty but she still has just as compelling an interest—
she may need the legal obligation fulfilled in order to secure the 
fundamentals of survival.48  The matter is complicated, however, because 
these important rights may be curtailed by helping out the contemnor 
                                                                                                     
 42. See Boggess, supra note 22, at 2 (citing the outcome between those contemnors 
who try to resolve the deficiency with a lawyer and those who try to resolve the family 
matter without); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (admitting the “obvious 
truth” that “any person, haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured 
a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him”). 
 43. See id. (showing such disparity makes it hard to believe the system is fairly 
handling those sans counsel, being that it is unlikely that those with lawyers have twice as 
many meritorious claims as those without). 
 44. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518 (agreeing with the proposition that compares 
arrearages to income and shows that contemnors usually truly do not have the means to 
comply (citing Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support 
Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 117 
(2008))). 
 45. See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support 
Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 95 (2008) 
(questioning whether contempt proceedings are bringing back debtors’ prisons). 
 46. See id.  (“A variety of systemic and judicial flaws have coalesced to create a fertile 
environment for unjustified incarcerations. Prominent among these are serious deficiencies 
in current civil contempt practice. Restoration of equity and due process to this area will 
require an array of adjustments in federal and state law, agency practice, and judicial 
process.”). 
 47. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011) (explaining that the whole 
proceeding is just for the mother, who wants to be enforce her right to be paid). 
 48. See Sorenson, supra note 19 (stating that only 21 percent of the children in these 
arrangements live in households where the income exceeds 300 percent of the poverty 
threshold).  
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parent, and vice versa.49  Providing additional procedural protection for the 
debtor, such as a right to a lawyer, would upset the balance between the two 
parties because the plaintiff usually cannot afford representation herself.50  
Additionally with only pro se representation in the courtroom, the court is 
more likely to reach a more efficient solution, which benefits the plaintiff 
and the child.51  Summarily, an evaluation of the rights of one party in the 
legal system cannot be examined alone; the right of others are often 
implicated accordingly.52 
IV.  Civil Gideon Denied 
Considering the competing interests at stake, it is reasonable to 
conclude that both parties’ arguments had merits and that reasonable minds 
could differ on this issue.53  It was therefore surprising that the Supreme 
Court was unanimous in its decision that child support contemnors, under 
these circumstances, do not receive a right to counsel.54  Such an outcome 
seems especially surprising when one considers that the justices have 
strongly conflicting interpreting principles on matters such as due process.55  
Perhaps the 9-0 decision could then be justified on the reasoning that the 
justices did more than weigh interests, such as competing hardship and civil 
rights, and instead based their decision on current law and jurisprudence.56  
                                                                                                     
 49. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (“A requirement that the State provide counsel to 
the noncustodial parent in these cases could create an asymmetry of representation that 
would ‘alter significantly the nature of the proceeding.’”). 
 50. See Brief in Support of Respondent, supra note 21, at 4 (“Upsetting the balance 
would be a particularly serious problem in the child support context, where custodial parents 
are often pro se.”). 
 51. See Brief for Law Professors Benjamin Barton and Darryl Brown in Support of 
Respondent at 9, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10–10) (suggesting that 
empirical data shows that pro se representation is more likely to lead to a solution, and thus 
at least some type of resolution). 
 52. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (showing that the Supreme Court recognizes the 
dynamic between these two interests). 
 53. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011) (revealing that the Supreme 
Court considered both the opposing interests at stake to be significant). 
 54. See id. at 2507–09 (stating the unanimous holding of the Court). 
 55. See Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. 
REV. 63, 115–23 (2006) (using the case of Lawrence v. Texas, among others, to show how 
there are different Court interpretations as to what “due process” means). 
 56. See id. (showing how interpretations of the law differ). 
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Yet, an examination of these authorities below proves that the justices did 
not use these in reaching their decision either, and because of this, the Note 
proposes an answer of why the justices were nonetheless able to unite in 
this case.57 The supposition is plainly that this case was decided as a 
common sense conclusion from a survey of the legal system instead of the 
result of an attempted Due Process Clause interpretation.58  To prove such a 
conclusion, the Note turns to surveying the pre-Turner landscape.59 
A.  How Civil Gideon Case Law Pre-Turner Had Already Answered the 
Question 
A beginning point for examining how the case should have been 
decided is how the courts have ruled in similar cases—the law on the 
books.60  Although Turner is explicitly limited to child support contempt 
proceedings, before the case was decided the Court had already taken up 
the issue of whether a lawyer should be required in a civil matter such as 
this family law issue.61  In particular, the two cases of Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services of Durham County62 and In Re Gault63 
addressed such concern.64  There is also the crucial contempt case of 
Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Company65 that provides some guidance 
                                                                                                     
 57. See infra notes 154–69 and accompanying text (asserting the proposition that the 
justices may have reached their unanimity for practical reasons). 
 58. See infra notes 154–69 and accompanying text (explaining how the realities of the 
legal system can be juxtaposed next to Due Process discussion). 
 59. See infra notes 60–153 and accompanying text (analyzing the pre-Turner case law 
that could have been used in deciding the case). 
 60. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2510 (2011) (showing that Justice Breyer’s 
analysis of this due process issue also begins with a survey of case law).  
 61. See generally Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (analyzing 
whether there is a right to counsel in another family law matter, one involving parental status 
termination proceedings). 
 62. See id. at 34 (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does 
not mandate representation for an indigent parent in parental status termination proceeding). 
 63. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause “requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which 
may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the 
child and his parents must be notified of the child’s right to be represented by counsel 
retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to 
represent the child”). 
 64. See id.; see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 34 (showing that the issue in these cases was 
whether civil Gideon was guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 65. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 452 (1911) (dismissing 
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in this matter.66  Additionally, although not controlling, the state cases of 
Pasqua v. Council67 and Krieger v. Commonwealth68 contained helpful 
legal analysis.69  Altogether, the law had already begun to form how the 
civil Gideon issue in Turner would be handled, although not in the direction 
that Turner turned it.70 
1.  United States Supreme Court Case Law 
a.  Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County 
Both sides and Justice Breyer could not avoid mention of one 1981 
United States Supreme Court case:  Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services of Durham County.71  This is because in Lassiter, the pertinent 
question was whether an indigent mother had a right to counsel in a child 
custody proceeding.72  The Court, instead of answering ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ 
punted the question of whether the parental termination proceedings in their 
states needed this due process requirement to the lower courts.73  Perhaps 
because of the slightly different end goal of the litigant—child custody 
instead of child custody payments—and because the right to counsel was 
                                                                                                     
the case in part because the lower court treated the injunctive case as if it was a criminal 
proceeding when really it should have proceeded in equity).  
 66. See id. at 441–44 (providing guidance on whether a contempt case is civil or 
criminal in nature, which is a preliminary question for the case at hand because criminal 
defendants with a possibility of imprisonment are guaranteed counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment, while civil Gideon is not provided for in the U.S. Constitution). 
 67. See Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 666 (N.J. 2006) (holding that the Federal 
and State Constitutions provide for a right to counsel in child support contempt cases). 
 68. See Krieger v. Commonwealth, 567 S.E.2d 557, 564 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) (finding 
that a person held in civil contempt for failure to abate a nuisance was not guaranteed a right 
to counsel in order to order to ensure substantial justice for due process).  
 69. See id.; see also Pasqua, 892 A.2d at 666 (showing that these state cases also 
address civil Gideon issues at stake in Turner). 
 70. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1967) (showing that the United States 
Supreme Court found that the Due Process Clause necessitated the availability of counsel in 
at least this one civil proceeding). 
 71. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2510 (2011) (indicating that Justice Breyer 
started discussing Lassiter at the beginning of his opinion). 
 72. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33–34 (1981) (concluding that 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does not mandate representation for an 
indigent parent in parental status termination proceeding). 
 73. See id. at 31–32 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli as allowing lower courts to weigh the 
Mathews v. Eldridge factors for more individualized determinations). 
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never explicitly granted, the Turner Court did not give the case much 
weight.74  But many parts of the decision, including the method of 
analyzing civil Gideon cases, are seemingly on point.75 
For example, after Justice Stewart, the authoring justice, summarized 
previous right-to-counsel cases, he “note[d] that Gideon was sentenced to 
prison for five years, that Argersinger was also imprisoned if only briefly, 
that Gault was committed to an institution in which his freedom was 
curtailed, and that Scott had no right to counsel because he was not actually 
sentenced to confinement.”76  In essence, he explains that the cases in 
which the Supreme Court granted counsel involved confinement as a 
possible sentence.77  The justice then reads this case law as saying that there 
is actually a presumption in favor of an appointed lawyer when 
confinement is a penalty.78  The justice proceeded to distinguish Lassiter 
based upon the fact that the potential punishment was denial of child 
custody privileges, not imprisonment.79  Reapplying this analysis to Turner 
shows that the case’s circumstances, under which the defendant could 
potentially be jailed for a significant amount of time, align with the Court’s 
presumption in favor of counsel.80  Therefore, although the Court used this 
case to support their decision to not grant counsel, citing it as precedent of a 
civil case where counsel was not granted, Lassiter can more correctly be 
seen as precedent that a Turner scenario would be found deserving of this 
extra procedural protection.81  The way in which Lassiter tied deprivation 
                                                                                                     
 74. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2515–17 (showing that Justice Breyer disposes of 
precedent in a few short paragraphs, seemingly finding limited guidance, and no on-point 
discussion). 
 75. See infra notes 76–85 and accompanying text (explaining that many parts of the 
Lassiter opinion seem to be applicable to Turner). 
 76. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Story of Lassiter: The Importance of Counsel in an 
Adversary System, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 514–15 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 
2004). 
 77. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25–26 (observing that all previous Court holdings where 
the right to counsel has been granted involved a threat of imprisonment). 
 78. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981) (“[T]he Court’s 
precedents speak with one voice about what ‘fundamental fairness’ has meant when the 
Court has considered the right to appointed counsel, . . . an indigent litigant has a right to 
appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.”). 
 79. See id. at 31 (examining the parental interests at stake when doing a Mathews 
balancing test). 
 80. See id. at 26–27 (setting up a presumption against which “all the other elements in 
the due process decision must be measured”). 
 81. See id. (evidencing that Lassiter was not limited in any way to parental 
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of liberty to the right to counsel merits more discussion than the Turner 
Court affords it.82 
Another relevant part of the Lassiter opinion involved the Court’s 
statement that it did not have to limit itself to constitutional interpretation 
when determining whether to appoint counsel in civil cases.83  Justice 
Stewart explained that public policy may also be considered, and that it 
may require “higher standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable 
under the Constitution.”84  In Lassiter, the Court could not decide whether 
the addition of counsel would add to the fairness and justice of the 
proceedings and so left the decision to the discretion to the states.85  In 
contrast, looking at both the risk of error and the more severe punishment in 
Turner, a strong argument can be made that adding the right to counsel will 
result in a significantly more just proceeding.86 
To conclude, it is clear that Lassiter was cited by the amicus curiae of 
Turner for good reason.87  While the Court never came down strongly in 
Lassiter, it certainly did set the stage for the provision of counsel in a 
situation exactly like Turner’s.88 
b.  In re Gault 
Another case that Justice Breyer disregarded as not being on point was 
In re Gault.89  Yet, this case also deserved more attention than the justice 
                                                                                                     
proceedings, but instead seems applicable to civil family law cases generally). 
 82. See id. at 26 (concluding that as “the litigant’s interest in personal liberty 
diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel”). 
 83. See id. at 37 (“Where an individual’s liberty interest assumes sufficiently weighty 
constitutional significance, and the State by a formal and adversarial proceeding seeks to 
curtail that interest, the right to counsel may be necessary to ensure fundamental fairness.”). 
 84. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981) (providing an 
additional factor to the Mathews balancing test that courts should consider for analyzing a 
grant of civil Gideon). 
 85. See id. at 31–32 (discussing that many factors, like those of informality, flexibility, 
and economy, were best to decide on a case-by-case basis). 
 86. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2011) (noting that the interest at 
stake in Turner is a risk of incarceration, not simply a child custody proceeding). 
 87. See Thornburg, supra note 76, at 523–26 (explaining that several lessons can be 
learned from Lassiter in regards to the appointment of counsel). 
 88. See id. at 524 (showing how the conclusions from Lassiter are broad, and thus they 
could be applicable to civil Gideon cases generally, particularly to other family law civil 
Gideon cases). 
 89. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510 (listing In re Gault as another case that does not 
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afforded it.90  In In re Gault, the United States Supreme Court afforded a 
right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings.91  Because Turner was 
not a juvenile proceding, Justice Breyer would be right if a narrow 
interpretation of In re Gault is taken.92  However, juvenile delinquency 
proceedings, like child contempt cases, are noncriminal family law matters 
with a potential for incarceration.93  Additionally, there is no explicit right 
to counsel in such matters; instead, the Court read this due process 
requirement from the Fourteenth Amendment.94 Therefore, the conclusion 
that In re Gault was not reasonable precedent for Turner v. Rogers is a 
questionable one.95   
In Turner, the justices never fully explained why Lassiter and In re 
Gault were distinguishable, nor did they explicitly overrule the cases.96  
Either of these alternatives would have left those reading the Turner 
opinion satisfied with the Court’s reasoning, but because the Court did 
neither, it is a mystery why the Court’s recent civil Gideon analysis was not 
given more attention.97 
c.  Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Company 
Finally, a Supreme Court case not directly dealing with civil Gideon, 
but instead with the distinction between civil and criminal contempt, 
demands attention because Justice Breyer’s reasoning in Turner was 
founded on the distinction it established.98  In 1911, the Court in Gompers 
                                                                                                     
provide any definitive answer for Turner). 
 90. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1967) (granting a right to counsel in a civil 
case where the defendant faced possible confinement). 
 91. See id. (explaining the holding of the case). 
 92. See generally Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (discussing civil Gideon in 
the child contempt setting, not in a juvenile proceeding). 
 93. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 76–77 (explaining the procedure of a juvenile case). 
 94. See id. at 30–31 (showing that the Court derived the requirement of a right to 
counsel from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause where it was not explicitly 
granted). 
 95. See id. (demonstrating that the exact same analysis was used in both In re Gault 
and Turner v. Rogers). 
 96. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2516 (interpreting precedent to draw a presumption in 
favor of counsel when there is a possibility of incarceration, but not deriving any further 
legal guidance from the cases). 
 97. See id. (showing that the Court never made any effort to distinguish Lassiter and 
In re Gault). 
 98. See Boggess, supra note 22, at 1 (“The court based its decision on the difference 
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v. Buck’s Stove & Range Company declared that if a contemnor can choose 
to obey his sentence at any time, then the contemnor has the possibility of 
release within his own discretion—he has the keys to his jail cell in his 
pocket.99  In such cases, the sentence is meant for coercion instead of 
punishment, and the contempt is a civil one.100 
In practice, however, the civil and criminal contempt distinction is far 
from clear-cut.101  For example, in the 2006 New Jersey Supreme Court 
case of Pasqua v. Council, the Court started its analysis with an internal 
conflict among the state’s laws.102  The Court found precedent which stated 
that a contempt proceeding is “essentially criminal” in nature and is ordered 
for the purpose of the contemnor’s punishment.103  In contrast, however, 
another law stated that an order to enforce a litigant’s right against a 
defendant was “essentially civil” because the major benefit of the contempt 
order is for the civil litigant.104  The type of conflict here has reasonably led 
to confusion, and modern day judges have been in a quandary about how to 
distinguish among the contempt cases in accordance with Gompers case 
law.105  Even the American Bar Association has conceded that “the line 
between civil and criminal contempt proceedings has become increasingly 
blurred . . . and thus cannot provide a useful basis for determining the right 
to counsel where personal liberty is at stake.”106  And as one observer 
commented, “it’s kind of shocking to see no right to counsel in a case 
                                                                                                     
between civil and criminal contempt . . . .”). 
 99. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 452 (1911) (relating the 
holding in the case). 
 100. See id. at 441–43 (explaining the distinction between a civil and criminal contempt 
case). 
 101. See Brief of Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. at 5, Turner v. Roger, 
131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10) (explaining that the civil and criminal is not a distinction 
that is easily vetted out). 
 102. See Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 670 (N.J. 2006) (showing that in one 
paragraph, the court concludes that the proceeding is “essentially criminal,” and then in the 
next paragraph says that it is “essentially civil”). 
 103. See id. (citing several cases and a statute for the proposition that the case should be 
considered a criminal one). 
 104. See id. (citing a statute and Judicial Counsel as saying that the case is a civil one 
because of its intended result—vindication). 
 105. See Brief of Nat’l Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. at 5, Turner v. Roger, 
131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10) (relating the confusion of the courts in interpreting and 
applying Gompers to modern day cases on this matter). 
 106. Id. 
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which someone faces more jail time than he would face for criminal 
contempt.”107 
Yet for legal analysis that has caused immense confusion and 
application among highly intellectual individuals, Justice Breyer disposed 
of his contempt distinction analysis fairly quickly, and he did so with 
questionable reasoning.108  The justice assumed that in child contempt 
matters the defendants have the ability to pay, and they therefore have the 
ability to release themselves from jail at any time.109  He in fact declared 
that he was sure that the defendants had income, such as from illegal drug 
dealing, but that they were simply not reporting it to the courts.110  This is a 
strong assumption to make, particularly because statistics like the ones cited 
supra show that this assumption does not seem to be an accurate one.111  In 
the particular case of Turner v. Rogers, the family court never found that 
Turner presently had the ability to pay.112  It seems more likely, if following 
the reasoning laid out in Gompers, that Turner’s contempt was not a civil 
matter.113  Such a conclusion is important because part of the reason Justice 
Breyer said he could rest easy with less procedural safeguards is because 
the case was one of civil contempt.114  If the justices analyzed the situation 
with a fresh look at Gompers, they may not have been so quick to decide 
that the proceeding was civil, that less protective due process procedures 
were then constitutional, and that therefore there is no afforded right to 
                                                                                                     
 107. Walsh, supra note 15. 
 108. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516–17 (showing that the Court relates the 
basic holding of Gompers, and seemingly does not really apply the rule to the facts of the 
current case). 
 109. See id. at 2526.  
 110. See id. (concluding that child support contemnors actually do have the ability to 
pay, but that this simply will not be found by the court because they are working in illegal 
markets). 
 111. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 27, at 9 (relating that the financial situation 
of these contemnors is often abysmal). 
 112. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2509 (“The judge found Turner in willful contempt and 
sentenced him to 12 months in prison without making any finding as to his ability to pay or 
indicating on the contempt order form whether he was able to make support payments.”). 
 113. See id. at 2516 (showing that where Justice Breyer analyzed Gompers, he 
incorrectly relied on the contemnor having the ability to pay, and that if this assumption is 
corrected, then the inability to pay may take Turner out of the civil context). 
 114. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011) (relating that the justice was 
going to follow case law supporting the notion that less procedural protection can be allowed 
for civil cases than must be ensured for criminal ones). 
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counsel.115  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not engage in such 
reasoning and they proceeded to a Mathews v. Eldridge116 analysis instead, 
one that can be criticized in its own regard.117 
2.  Influential Case Law 
Beyond the Supreme Court, though, civil Gideon law was still being 
theorized and applied, and therefore before Turner reached the Court there 
was a wealth of judicial opinions addressing this due process concern.118  
Although not controlling on the Court, these analyses are helpful guidance 
on how to apply jurisprudence to the matter.119  This is especially true 
because the matter is a family law concern, which is traditionally handled 
by the states, and it is an area where the judges have experience and 
expertise.120  Two cases particularly worthy of examination are Pasqua v. 
Council and Krieger v. Commonwealth.121 
a.  Pasqua v. Council 
In Pasqua, which was a child support contempt case like Turner, the 
2006 New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the legality of civil Gideon 
under both the state and federal laws and Constitutions.122  In this child 
                                                                                                     
 115. See id. (analyzing the civil and criminal distinction with both falsely laid 
assumption and without much application to the particular facts of a child support contempt 
case). 
 116. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341–48 (1976) (relating that risk of error, 
weight of private interest, and interests of other parties are the three factors to be examined 
when analyzing what due process is constitutionally granted before a private interest, like 
liberty, is taken away by the government). 
 117. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510 (relating that the Court spent most of its opinion on 
its Mathews analysis, instead of analyzing the foundation of its reasoning, which is 
determined through Gompers analysis). 
 118. See Thornburg, supra note 76, at 513–17 (listing numerous right to appointed 
counsel cases that the Court decided previously). 
 119. See Thornburg, supra note 76, at 513–17 (examining principles applicable to 
Turner, even if the case law is determined to not be on point). 
 120. See Helen Alvare, Traditional Family Law: Connecting Marriage with Children, 
THE WITHERSPOON INST. (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/12/4397/ 
(“It is important to understand that family law is made in large part at the state level.”). 
 121. See infra notes 122–53 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d. 663, 666 (N.J. 2006) (explaining at the very 
beginning of the opinion that the court determined to analyze due process implications under 
both the Federal and the State Constitution). 
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support contempt case, the judges explained that the right to counsel is 
implicit in the New Jersey Constitution, but that furthermore, such a 
concept is also within the U.S. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause.123 
Judge Albin, who wrote the opinion of the Court, explained that based 
on the above United States Supreme Court precedent, the civil and criminal 
contempt distinction should not be the deciding factor for counsel 
assignment.124  Instead, what is decisive is whether there is adequate due 
process in order for justice to result.125  The judge then engaged in a 
detailed discussion about whether a child support contempt proceeding 
without a lawyer is a fair one—a type of analysis that was absent in 
Turner.126  The Court explicitly rejected the assumptions of the Turner 
Supreme Court, seemingly relying more heavily on studies explaining the 
high risk of error and revealing that frequently judges do not make an 
express finding of a contemnor’s ability to pay.127  As Justice Breyer then 
cites the same findings in his opinion, it is surprising that the United States 
Supreme Court does not also find the studies to be significantly troubling.128 
Additionally, the judges made an interesting observation not made by 
the Supreme Court justices.129  While the Turner justices noted that such 
proceedings repeatedly occur for the same family—Turner had previously 
                                                                                                     
 123. See id. at 674, 675 (concluding that a right to counsel is a necessary procedural 
protection for these types of contempt cases). 
 124. See id. at 671 (relating that the judge did not take a strictly Gompers analysis for 
the basis for his decision, in contrast to Justice Breyer). 
 125. See id. (examining the requirements for due process and deciding, like in Lassiter, 
that “fundamental fairness” can also be a factor, even if not a requirement from the 
Constitution itself). 
 126. See id. at 671 (“Although requiring counsel may complicate the procedures 
pertaining to enforcement of court orders, it protects important constitutional values, 
including the fairness of our civil justice system.”); see generally Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. 
Ct. 2507 (2011). 
 127. See id. at 673 (“When an indigent litigant is forced to proceed at an ability-to-pay 
hearing without counsel, there is a high risk of an erroneous determination and wrongful 
incarceration.”). 
 128. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011). 
(referencing studies and the case of McBride v. McBride, which both conclude that “failure 
of trial courts to make a determination of a contemnor's ability to comply is not altogether 
infrequent”). 
 129. See Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 673 (N.J. 2006) (explaining that “[t]he task 
is that much more difficult when the indigent must defend himself after he has already been 
deprived of his freedom”). 
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been sentenced to jail and was likely to be sentenced again—they do not 
take any type of conclusion from this except as assurance that the case was 
not moot.130  The Pasqua court, though, after making the same finding, used 
that conclusion to argue that the task of sound pro se representation is 
“much more difficult when the indigent must defend himself after he has 
already been deprived of his freedom.”131   This more thorough analysis 
picks up on an additional reason for civil Gideon that is missing from the 
Turner opinion—that these contemnors are less and less likely to have the 
resources necessary to make a case, yet at the same time they are also less 
and less likely to have an ability to pay.132  It is unclear how Turner v. 
Rogers was decided without weighing such a compelling factor, especially 
one that had already been discussed in case law by the time that the case 
reached the bench.133 
The judges in the case then proceeded to do a Mathews balancing test, 
much like the one that the majority decided to do in Turner.134  Because of 
the above reasons, however, the Pasqua court concluded that the available 
procedure was insufficient, stating that, “We cannot accept the regime 
suggested by defendants as an acceptable constitutional safeguard for an 
indigent litigant facing incarceration in a judicial proceeding. The good 
intentions and fair-mindedness of a Superior Court judge are not an 
adequate constitutional substitute for a defendant’s right to counsel when 
jail time is at stake.”135  The Court underscored this understanding by 
stating that even though it trusted both the judges and the fundamentals of 
the justice system, this type of proceeding is more complicated than it may 
seem.136  A well-executed defense in such a case requires more than just 
                                                                                                     
 130. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2514–15 (relating that the case is not moot because it is 
“capable of repetition” yet “evading review” because of the continually renewed hearings on 
child contempt that one family will face). 
 131. See Pasqua, 892 A.2d at 673 (implicating that contempt cases are a particular type 
of civil case where due process may be more at risk because of the worsening conditions that 
the defendant finds himself in). 
 132. See id. (examining the reality that because these are repeat cases, the defendant 
will likely find himself in a worse and worse condition to represent himself sans counsel). 
 133. See generally Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (showing that discussion 
on this concern is absent from any of the Supreme Court opinions). 
 134. See Pasqua, 892 A.2d  at 672 (“The Mathews factors must be weighed against the 
presumptive right to appointed counsel that attaches when an indigent is subject to 
incarceration.”). 
 135. Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 670 (N.J. 2006). 
 136. See id. at 673 (explaining that while tasks such as gathering evidence, presenting 
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document production; it still requires filing legal documents and structuring 
compelling legal arguments.137  Essentially, more procedure was needed 
than one may believe.138 
b.  Krieger v. Commonwealth 
Further guidance also came from the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Annuziata in the 2002 Virginia appellate case of Krieger v. 
Commonwealth.139  Again, because this case was not controlling for the 
Supreme Court, the Court was free to easily overlook or ignore it.140  Still, 
Judge Annuziata’s opinion was a great overview of civil Gideon law and 
jurisprudence behind the pro-counsel argument in child support contempt 
cases.141  The judge closely examined the civil right of due process before 
incarceration and made the compelling argument that liberty is a 
fundamental interest, one that affects not just the quality of one’s life but 
also one’s career and reputation.142  Justice Breyer spent only a few short 
paragraphs on this interest—deprivation of liberty for up to a year of the 
defendant’s life—and he did not discuss these interests in career and 
reputation.143  Altogether, though, these interests are too significant for the 
amount of attention that they were given.144    
                                                                                                     
testimony, and articulating a defense may seem simple to a lawyer or a judge, these are 
“perhaps insuperable undertakings to the uninitiated layperson”). 
 137. See id. (evidencing that the proceeding is not an easy one for the defendant to 
handle, and thus it cannot be assumed that a layperson can proceed in court alone). 
 138. See id. (suggesting that perhaps the legal professionals who are deciding these 
cases cannot understand how an ordinary person would handle representation incorrectly, 
even though they certainly may). 
 139. See Krieger v. Commonwealth, 567 S.E.2d 557, 586–87 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) 
(Annuziata, J., dissenting) (examining the issue of whether the government should guarantee 
a nuisance contemnor a lawyer). 
 140. See id. at 559 (showing that it was a Virginia Appellate Court case, which means 
that it is not controlling precedent for the Supreme Court). 
 141. See id. at 578–84 (examining a large amount of cases addressing civil Gideon). 
 142. See id. at 586 (pointing out a defendant in contempt’s civil rights interests in cases 
where there is a possibility of incarceration). 
 143. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518–19 (2011) (admitting that the risk of 
error in Turner is high, but nonetheless not spending much time examining the interplay of 
this Mathews factor with the interests of others in order to explain how the interests of others 
must ultimately outweigh this factor). 
 144. See Krieger, 567 S.E.2d at 577 n.3 (relating that the dissent spends too much time 
talking about how opinions like the majority’s incorrectly apply the Mathews factors). 
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Additionally, like the Pasqua court, Judge Annuziata disregarded any 
reliance on the civil and criminal distinction and instead made clear that jail 
is jail.145  He explained that many other judges have also ignored the 
distinction because of this hard fact, citing, for example, Walker v. 
McLain,146 where the court decided in favor of the right to counsel because 
“jail is just as bleak” for the civil litigant.147  This is simply a strong logical 
argument in favor of civil Gideon.148  Also, although Justice Thomas argued 
against the right to counsel because of the absence of an explicit civil 
counterpart to the Sixth Amendment in the Constitution, a counterargument 
using the logic that Judge Annuziata provides is that, simply put, 
Americans have explicitly recognized in this constitutional provision that 
counsel is needed at times for adequate due process, and the quintessential 
punishment where right to counsel process is afforded is imprisonment.149  
And if the American people feel that counsel is needed in order to ensure a 
fair trial for those facing imprisonment in one courtroom, the same 
safeguards may be needed where the exact same punishment is set in 
another.150  Justice Thomas’ point seems to then be countered, but it is hard 
to know how Justice Thomas would respond because he did not fully 
engage in this analysis.151 
Overall, then, while the Court cited very little precedent in its opinion, 
and concluded that none were directly on point, upon examination of the 
prior case law, at least some of the arguments, modes of analysis, and 
                                                                                                     
 145. See Krieger v. Commonwealth, 567 S.E.2d 557, 580 n.5 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“Indeed, the very nature of the proceeding and the resulting relief must be discerned 
especially in cases of contempt, where the line between civil and criminal penalties has 
become increasingly blurred in order to determine the proper applicability of federal 
constitutional protections.”). 
 146. See Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1985) (denying a habeas 
corpus petition that incarceration without counsel violated the petitioner’s due process rights 
because the court did not find that the petitioner could not afford a lawyer). 
 147. See Krieger, 567 S.E.2d at 562–65 (explaining that the civil and criminal 
distinction does not make much sense when the penalties for both are the same). 
 148. See id. (showing that perhaps the distinction set forth in Gompers is not applicable 
to the contempt cases under discussion). 
 149. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2521–23 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(surveying Justice Thomas’s arguments regarding the Sixth Amendment). 
 150. See id. (comparing the civil contempt case to those criminal cases to which the 
Sixth Amendment applies). 
 151. See id. at 2521–27 (showing that Justice Thomas did not discuss the outstanding 
similarities between the child support contempt cases and the ones which he approves of 
counsel being afforded to). 
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concepts should have been addressed in Turner.152  Unfortunately, very few 
were, with the end result that there is now less procedural protection for 
these defendants without much guidance as to why the state courts, who 
attempted better protection for them, were wrong.153 
V.  Practicality Discussion—The Glaringly Avoided Topic 
Given this gaping analysis of existing law and jurisprudence, and 
given the current state of the legal system, it is worth mentioning the idea 
that Turner v. Rogers may simply have been a practical decision because 
there is just no way that America could give all of its Turners lawyers.154  
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court stated in Lassiter that the costs of 
providing counsel should not be considered a significant factor when 
deciding whether or not to provide counsel, it is actually an unavoidable 
conclusion.155 
First, the current state of criminal Gideon seems to make this 
obvious.156  Recently, Attorney General Eric Holder called attention to 
several prime examples of this, like a Tennessee public defender office 
where six attorneys are assigned to handle 10,000 misdemeanor cases per 
year.157  Sadly, however, even a story like this included in the Attorney 
General’s overview of criminal Gideon justice does not even do the 
situation justice.158  Upon examination of criminal Gideon, one cannot help 
                                                                                                     
 152. See generally Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (showing that very few of 
the aforementioned civil rights concerns were brought under the purview of the Court). 
 153. See id. (showing that the Supreme Court barely addressed compelling state cases 
on this subject, like Pasqua, nor did it spend much attention on relevant Supreme Court 
cases). 
 154. Tod Aronovitz, Gideon—Then and Now, 77 FLA. BAR J. 6 (2003), available at 
http://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Author/C2185D2B6A0C301785256CD
9004E5ABD (citing Stephen Bright, the director of the Southern Center for Human Rights in 
Atlanta, Georgia, as summating that “‘[n]o constitutional right is celebrated so much in the 
abstract and observed so little in reality as the right to counsel’”). 
 155. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (“But though the 
State's pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is hardly significant enough to overcome private 
interests as important as those here . . . .”). 
 156. See Kelley, supra note 29, at 5–7 (relating several studies that show how criminal 
Gideon is not functioning properly). 
 157. See Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 
FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1252–53 (2010). 
 158. See id. (revealing that the stories of the Attorney General are only a few of the 
many that, in their totality, prove that government-appointed counsel is not sufficient). 
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but admit that “[a]t the trial level, because every indigent is entitled to free 
counsel, few if any receive competent representation.”159  As one scholar 
aptly puts it, “Appointing counsel who—due to any number of factors—
provide sub-par representation strips Gideon of its radical dexterity, and 
replaces Gideon’s mighty trumpet with the equivalent of a child’s 
kazoo.”160   
Secondly, even stepping back from the current Gideon system, there 
are overarching reasons for why civil Gideon will not come to fruition.161  
Currently, many child support contemnors proceed as defendants sans 
counsel.162  But any economist would have to conclude that the present 
situation would be drastically worse if litigants like Turner were allowed 
government-funded counsel, for “if you price a good or service below the 
market rate, people will want more of it . . . and that’s not necessarily good 
for the litigants themselves, or for society as a whole.”163  From current 
government attempts into this realm, it seems clear that such a system 
would be prohibitively expensive while providing less than an adequate 
quality of protection.164 
As mentioned above, however, these glaring practical limitations 
should not play a part in the ruling, and on its face, they didn’t;  the Court 
never expressly addressed such limitations in Turner, and the former 
Lassiter holding can perhaps be seen to silently stand in instead.165  Still, it 
                                                                                                     
 159. See Lawrence J. Siskind, Civil Gideon: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Come, 
AMERICAN THINKER (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/08/civil_gideon 
_an_idea_whose_time_should_not_come.html (highlighting the fact that sometimes well-
intended plans do not implement well upon practice). 
 160. See Kelley, supra note 29, at 5 (explaining that prior decrees for right to counsel 
has essentially been meaningless). 
 161. See Siskind, supra note 159 (explaining how civil Gideon would function in 
accordance with micro and macroeconomic principles). 
 162. Joy Moses, Grounds for Objection: Causes and Consequences of America’s Pro 
Se Crisis and How to Solve the Problem of Unrepresented Litigants, CENTER FOR AMERICAN 
PROGRESS 3–5 (June 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/pdf/object 
ion.pdf (explaining that pro se representation is normal with both low and moderate-income 
litigants, as well as in family law cases). 
 163. See Siskind, supra note 159. 
 164. See id. (explaining why free services do not function well with a market 
economy). 
 165. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (showing that in 
Lassiter, the Court clarified that the cost of providing counsel should not be a significant 
factor in whether to provide this procedural protection);  see generally Turner v. Rogers, 131 
S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (revealing that this precedent on weighing state costs is absent from the 
Court’s discussion in Turner). 
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is impossible to discuss the options before the Court in this case without 
discussing that there may have really only been one option.166  A right to 
civil Gideon would have crippled what many believe is already an 
extremely broken system.167  If the Court mandated something that actually 
could never occur, there are two potential, devastating consequences:  first, 
the courts will not be able to handle actually providing the right, and any 
just and swift consideration under the law would be close to impossible; 
and second, the American people would likely doubt the vitality of their 
legal justice system as a result.168  Surely the justices must have considered 
such consequences, and thus the absence of any discussion of them in the 
Turner opinion, either in the majority or the dissent, is significant.169 
VI.  Mandated Procedural Safeguards 
The Turner majority concluded that four procedural safeguards should 
be mandated down to the states to ensure that the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause is still being upheld even without a right to counsel.170  
These four protections are:  
(1) notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in 
the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to 
elicit relevant financial information from him; (3) an opportunity at the 
hearing for him to respond to statements and questions about his 
financial status; and (4) an express finding by the court that the 
defendant has the ability to pay.171 
                                                                                                     
 166. See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding 
and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 969 (2012) (explaining that resources 
are already spread too thin and that instituting civil Gideo “would undercut Gideon itself”). 
 167. See id. at 990–91 (2012) (examining the budgets of government and explaining 
that, “[i]n the past, the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged funding constraints as a 
reason not to expand the right to counsel”). 
 168. See Joy Moses, supra note 162, at 5–7 (revealing that often these types of cases 
can proceed through the court system faster with only pro se representation, while also 
explaining that our society has a reliance on the court system to function properly, saying 
that “[u]naddressed legal needs threaten commonly shared notions that America is a place 
where anyone can get justice.”). 
 169. See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, supra note 167, at 990 (showing that 
the justices have talked about funding concerns in prior cases). 
 170. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011) (explaining that the Court 
mandated four “substitute procedural safeguards”). 
 171. Id. 
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The majority also left open the option of having more safeguards in 
place; a state after Turner may still institute a mandatory right to counsel 
program.172  This gives leeway to states that already had civil Gideon 
systems in place.173  For example, California, as one of the blindly 
optimistic states to take on such an obligation, has tried to implement such a 
program but has not to date successfully carried it out.174  In fact, the 
program has already seemingly amounted to a disaster, as the state has had 
to slash its funding and send out layoff notices to about a third of its 
employees.175 
Regardless, more safeguards may indeed be needed as the ones the 
Court prescribes were never vetted out, either before the case was decided 
or during it.176  As Justice Thomas explained, the case was simply about 
whether an indigent child support contemnor should receive a right to 
counsel.177  All nine justices answered ‘no.’178  The parties were not asking 
what procedure was then due instead, but the majority nevertheless entered 
into such a discussion, from which the safeguards followed.179  Because the 
parties did not raise the issue of what procedure was due, however, the 
Court did not have many due process suggestions before it.180  In fact, it 
only had one such suggestion before it—that found in the federal 
                                                                                                     
 172. See id. at 2519–20 (claiming that the Court is receptive to other procedural 
safeguard alternatives in addition to the four just presented). 
 173. See id. (explaining that the Supreme Court is not limiting states to only these 
procedural safeguards for the due process rights of child support contemnors, although 
certainly not leaving the states as much leeway as the Court did in Lassiter). 
 174. See Siskind, supra note 159 (describing California’s attempt at providing civil 
Gideon services). 
 175. See Siskind, supra note 159 (relating that to date, the state has been unable to keep 
the program fully operational). 
 176. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2524–26 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for incorrectly decreeing four safeguards when the Supreme Court 
had an insufficient record for that issue, and explaining that it was in answer to “a question 
raised exclusively in the Federal Government’s amicus brief”). 
 177. See id. at 2521 (clarifying that there was only one issue before the Court, not an 
additional one of what procedure a state should be required to provide to future child 
contemnor defendants). 
 178. See Barton & Bibas, supra note 167, at 970 (explaining the total unanimity of the 
Court’s decision on this issue). 
 179. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2512, 2519 (showing where Justice Breyer presented the 
issue before the Court, and then later where he mandated four procedural safeguards related 
to, but nevertheless not in line with, the issue). 
 180. See id. at 2524 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“As here, the parties may not address the 
new issue in this Court, leaving its boundaries untested.”). 
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government’s amicus curae brief.181  This switch in discussion is something 
Justice Thomas rightly criticized because American law is usually the result 
of diverse opinions and experiences coming together in the legislature, not 
the summation of one viewpoint of a group not even a party to the case.182  
Additionally, the safeguards are then not even assuredly effective; they 
were just the only suggestion on the table.183  If the Court was going to 
proceed in this manner, it should have considered other options to the 
adopted ones, like vetted suggestions from those dealing with the child 
support contempt cases regularly.184  As one observer noticed, the Court is 
far removed from how these cases actually function, and it thus may not be 
wise for them to assume they know the solution without gathering other 
expert legal opinions.185  “And of course, solutions to the pro se crisis 
should be guided by evidence-based approaches.”186  While not necessary, 
evidence about the strength of particular procedural protections would have 
helped the Court make a more informed decision. Louis S. Rulli, a 
professor at University of Pennsylvania Law School, while not talking 
specifically about the civil contempt cases, nevertheless sums this up nicely 
by stating that, “an overarching lesson from legal needs studies is that 
empirical research plays an important role in enhancing access to justice. 
Our society relies heavily upon empirical data to assess the efficacy of 
                                                                                                     
 181. See R. Reeves Anderson & Anthony J. Franze, Commentary: The Court’s 
increasing reliance on amicus curiae in the past term, NAT’L L. J., (Aug. 24, 2011), 
available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Arnold&PorterLLP_Nation 
alLawJournal_8.24.11.pdf  (explaining that the Supreme Court’s use of only one amicus 
curiae to decide the case is part of a larger legal trend where the Court is increasingly relying 
on amicus curiae briefs). 
 182. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2524. (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Accordingly, it is the wise and settled general practice of this Court not to consider an 
issue in the first instance, much less one raised only by an amicus.”). 
 183. See id. at 2525 (claiming that the majority said that they did know what they states 
were doing or what the “range of options out there” were). 
 184. See Jeffrey Selbin, Josh Rosenthal & Jeanne Charn, Access to Evidence: How an 
Evidence-Based Delivery System Can Improve Legal Aid for Low- and Moderate-Income 
Americans, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 8–11 (June 2011), available at http://www. 
americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/pdf/evidence.pdf (recommending the use of an 
evidence-based system). 
 185. See Mark Walsh, supra note 15 (explaining that those who are family law courts 
on a regular basis may be able to provide useful insight that the Court is not privy to). 
 186. Joy Moses, Grounds for Objection: Causes and Consequences of America’s Pro 
Se Crisis and How to Solve the Problem of Unrepresented Litigants, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS 11 (June 2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/ 
06/pdf/objection.pdf. 
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public initiatives and to chart future directions. Law is no exception.”187 
Other scholars agree.188 
VII.  Proposed Alternative Solutions 
A.  Establishing More New Law 
If the Court could have a do-over, though, there certainly are some 
alternatives that it could consider.189  First, the Court could read its 
precedent as guidance and allow the states to create their own solutions.190  
In Younger v. Harris,191 among other cases, the Court has expressed this 
idea of comity and federalism, saying that there should be:  
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the 
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and 
a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if 
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate 
functions in their separate ways.192 
This is what states do best, acting as diverse laboratories for the crises of 
their citizens.193 Understandably, such a comity may not work in all areas of 
                                                                                                     
 187. Louis S. Rulli, Money Well Spent: The Value of Civil Legal Assistance to the Poor, 
75 PHILA. LAW. 24, 25 (2012), available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/Web 
Objects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/TPL_mag_Fall
12_probono.pdf.  
 188. See Alan Houseman, The Justice Gap: Civil Legal Assistance Today and 
Tomorrow, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 12 (June 2011), available at http://www. 
americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/pdf/justice.pdf (“We need better ways to ensure legal 
aid programs use tested performance measures and engage in ongoing evaluation. We must 
also encourage funders to conduct evaluations for quality and effectiveness.”). 
 189. See Houseman, supra note 188, at 10–15 (showing alternative legal service 
delivery options that states either have already implemented or that the author believes the 
states should adopt). 
 190. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981) (leaving up to the 
lower courts the decision of how much procedure will be is due in the type of case before the 
Court). 
 191. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that a federal court cannot 
enjoin enforcement of a state statute just because that statute, on its face, abridges First 
Amendment rights).  
 192. Id. at 44. 
 193. See Michael S. Greve, Laboratories of Democracy: Anatomy of a Metaphor, 6 
AM. ENTER. INST. 1 (May 2011), http://www.aei.org/files/2001/03/31/Laboratories%20of 
%20Democracy%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Metaphor.pdf (“It is one of the happy 
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the law, but this is one where it probably would—states were already 
coming up with innovative solutions when they were left to their own 
devices before Turner.194  In fact, before the decision was handed down in 
June 2011, a majority of states had already come up with ways to provide 
counsel in situations where the child support contemnor was facing jail 
time.195  California, among other states, had tried a pilot program to test the 
feasibility of providing counsel to its Turners.196  Twenty-four states and the 
District of Columbia had all established their own access-to-justice 
commissions, and while these were not specifically focused on child 
support contemnors, they nevertheless innovated solutions that would help 
someone like Turner get a fair determination.197  The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania also had heartily taken on the issue, creating “IOLTA 
programs, filing fee surcharges, cy pres awards, and pro hac vice and 
attorney registration fees,” while also improving the commonwealth’s legal 
service delivery systems.198  Many of these options seem worthy of further 
explanation.199  Additionally, states may have solutions that they have not 
yet developed.200  For example, New York has recently made fifty hours of 
pro bono service a prerequisite to sitting for its bar.201  This state could 
                                                                                                     
incidents of the federal system,’ Justice Louis D. Brandeis wrote in 1932, ‘that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’”). 
 194. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Civil Gideon in Deadbeat Dad Cases Would be 
‘Massive’ Change, Lawyer Tells Justices, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 24, 2011, 9:12 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/civil_gideon_in_deadbeat_dad_cases_would_be_m
assive_change_lawyer_tells_jus/ (noting that a majority of states had some sort of civil 
Gideon assistance program in place). 
 195. See id. (explaining that many states already had some sort of assistance available 
before the Turner decision). 
 196. See Siskind, supra note 159 (mentioning the system California has tested). 
 197. See Houseman, supra note 188, at 7 (relating the many civil legal aid programs in 
place, and how technology and partnerships can be utilized successfully to protect the civil 
rights of the litigants). 
 198. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 25 (describing Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court as a 
leader in “expanding access to justice”). 
 199. See Houseman, supra note 188, at 6–7 (exploring different, feasible options that 
can be used to protect the civil rights of the child support contemnor). 
 200. See id. at 7–9 (explaining different financial and political barriers to full program 
implementation). 
 201. See Mosi Secret, Judge Details a Rule Requiring Pro Bono Work by Aspiring 
Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012 
/09/20/nyregion/pro-bono-work-becomes-a-requirement-to-practice-law-in-new-york.html? 
_r=0 (detailing this new requirement for practicing law in New York). 
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recommend or direct these applicants to assist in child support contempt 
proceedings, thus alleviating at least part of “the justice gap.”202 
If the federal government is worried about taking a complete hands-off 
approach, there are still ways that it could be involved in protecting due 
process.203  For example, the federal government could act as an analytical 
and statistical supervisor, measuring the efficacy of these programs.204  
Alternatively, one scholar has suggested that the federal government 
support states by forming an umbrella group for organization or by issuing 
a bond-type program for financial assistance.205 
Although America’s legal system is unique in some regards, the 
government can still survey the due process systems of other countries.206  
For example, Korea, similar to New York, has a high amount of pro se 
litigants; in Korea, more than eighty percent of the litigants are pro se, 
while ninety-nine percent of the defendants in New York City are pro se.207  
Yet, Korean judges take on a different role than American judges, in that 
they combine informal and formal proceedings through which most parties 
seem to reach informed and satisfactory solutions.208  Moreover, The 
European Convention on Human Rights includes a provision about 
providing civil Gideon and, as a result, several countries have set up 
programs to comply.209  While, because of the different legal and taxing 
                                                                                                     
 202. See id. (showing one option to satisfy the 50 hour requirement is to perform pro 
bono work for the poor). 
 203. See Houseman, supra note 188, at 12 (advocating for a system where the Legal 
Services Corporation, the Justice Department, and state access-to-justice commissions work 
together). 
 204. See Selbin et al., supra note 184, at 6 (“Regrettably, the federal government has 
made little effort to capture information about legal aid funding sources, service provision, 
and delivery outcomes. Insufficient data makes it hard to know how and where to spend the 
limited money available to get the best results for low and moderate-income Americans.”). 
 205. See Selbin et al., supra note 184, at 11 (“The president’s FY 2012 budget includes 
$100 million in social impact bonds to spur private investment in social interventions with 
the potential to serve public purposes and save public resources.”). 
 206. See Barton et al., supra note 167, at 989–90 (pointing out that the federal 
government can look to see how different countries’ court systems work). 
 207. JAMES R. MAXEINER, FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE xiv (2011). 
 208. See id. (referencing several successful alternative systems that American states and 
cities may want to examine when determining how to best provide legal protections). 
 209. See Anna Richey Allan, Passport for Civil Gideon: European Perspectives on the 
Civil Right to Counsel, LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 19–22 available at 
http://www.lsej.org/documents/472851Passport%20for%20Civil%20Gideon%20-%20Allen 
.pdf  (last visited Sept. 26, 2013) (discussing various different ways that the  right to counsel 
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systems, such a program might be more feasible in Europe, it is worth 
investigating the success of protections implemented abroad.210 If the 
United States federal government adopts the suggestion to take on a more 
research-related role, perhaps helping to pilot programs and to measure 
overall effectiveness of state efforts, the federal government could also look 
to the civil legal aid systems in Europe and Canada for guidance.211  
B.  Achieving Reform through Current Law 
Another suggestion is to accomplish civil Gideon through existing 
law.212  For example, one unique suggestion by right to counsel advocates is 
to use the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act for 
this end.213  “Using the ADA to argue for free legal representation as a 
courthouse accommodation for certain disabled individuals is both more 
restrictive and yet broader than arguing for a full civil Gideon . . . . ADA 
affords a broader remedy because its provisions are not ‘needs based’; that 
is, ADA accommodations are available to rich and poor alike . . . .”214 
Additionally, many defendants in child support contempt proceedings 
appear to be “individual[s] with a disability” and thus qualified for ADA 
protection.215 
                                                                                                     
in civil proceedings is handled in other countries). 
 210. See id. (showing that the legal systems in other countries are organized in a 
different way than the American legal system). 
 211. See Houseman, supra note 188, at 14–15 (commenting on the ways that other 
countries’ governments have handled civil Gideon). 
 212. See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What 
Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 72–
73 (2009), available at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2321& 
context=ulj (assessing the impact of assistance programs already working within the current 
law). 
 213. See Lisa Brodoff, Susan McClellan, & Elizabeth Anderson, The ADA: One Avenue 
to Appointed Counsel Before a Full Civil Gideon, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 609, 611 
(2004), available at  http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=14 
59&context=sjsj (examining one innovative way to use the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
within the bounds of the law, to further other civil rights concerns). 
 214. Id. at 611–12. 
 215. See id. at 616 (“A ‘person with a disability’ is defined as someone [with] . . . ‘(A) 
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as 
having such an impairment.’”). 
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Such a notion is compelling and will hopefully be tested.216  At the 
same time, such a concept may be too idealistic because only those familiar 
with the law would attempt to use the ADA to provide counsel to pro se 
indigent litigants, and if indigents in need of help already have such legal 
advice, then they probably would not need to use the ADA.217  The concept 
is a way of rerouting the current system because, as it stands, indigents are 
not always capable of forming sound legal arguments.218  Increasing the 
legal knowledge required to figure out how to qualify for assistance could 
complicate representation rather than ease it.219 
States could also work within the existing legal system—they could 
look into an alternative dispute resolution system; a more expanded type of 
small claims court, where lawyers are not allowed on either side;220 or a 
more specialized court, like a tax court, where the judges are better trained 
to determine whether the contemnor is able to pay.221  Instead of lawyers, it 
may be more beneficial to have someone similar to a bankruptcy referee, or 
perhaps the states can allow nonlawyers and paralegals to represent litigants 
in cases like Turner v. Rogers.222  A Center for American Progress work 
group recently published other alternatives in a truly weighty list: clerks’ 
offices can become more supportive; courts can provide multilingual pro se 
fact sheets; states can require allocution hearings; courts can simplify forms 
                                                                                                     
 216. See id. at 629 (explaining that the ADA is fully supported by state and federal law, 
and that the costs of expanding such a program are minimal when compared with the loss of 
housing, food, and other essentials that the litigants bear in order to enforce their civil 
rights). 
 217. See id. at 619–20 (explaining, for a different reason, that even with some forms of 
simplified pro se, the litigants are still unlikely to understand underlying legal issues; 
seemingly, it would also be hard for the litigants to understand the rights and exceptions in 
each ADA title). 
 218. See Brief in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 27, at 15 (“Civil contempt 
proceedings can be extremely complex and often require skills and expertise beyond the 
capacity of those too poor to retain counsel.”). 
 219. See Brief in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 27, at 15 (explaining that current 
litigants are already overwhelmed by the legal requirements necessary to make their cases). 
 220. See Siskind, supra note 159 (proffering some legal structures used in different 
types of claims). 
 221. See Brief in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 27, at 16 (explaining that other 
determinations that family law judges have to make, such as whether or not a party is 
indigent, are straightforward compared to deciding whether a party has an inability-to-pay). 
 222. See Richard Zorza, Turner v. Rogers: The Implications for Access to Justice 
Strategies, 95 JUDICATURE 255, 262 (2012), available at http://www.zorza.net/AJS-
Turner.pdf (suggesting alternative structures other than two pro se parties before a judge). 
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and place them online; judges and clerks can enter training programs; and 
they can pay more attention to the all-important settlement stage in these 
proceedings.223  In addition, there are legal procedures on the outskirts of 
American law that may be worth closer examination.224  For example, states 
can examine unbundling of lawyer services for these matters.225  
Alternatively, states can “increase opportunities for nonprevailing parties to 
recover attorney fees, so that deserving indigent parties will have a greater 
chance of attracting private counsel.”226 
Solutions are certainly already out there.227  If Turner had not been 
decided in such a broad stroke, perhaps the states would be better able to 
implement some of these solutions instead of being restricted by the new, 
unsupported, but nonetheless mandated procedures.228  Regardless, states 
are not restrained from implementing alternative nonconflicting safeguards 
in addition to those proscribed in Turner, and perhaps they will.229 
Finally, judges can also take on a more active reformative role.230  
Richard Zorza, a pro se expert, has suggested that judges invest in judicial 
education curriculum, instructional videos, and other best practices.231  Yet, 
                                                                                                     
 223. See Peter Edelman, When Second Best Is the Best We Can Do: Improving the 
Odds for Pro Se Civil Litigants, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 8 (June 2011), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/06/pdf/secondbest.pdf 
(highlighting a myriad of possible alternatives and additions to the current child support 
contempt proceeding). 
 224. See id. at 5–8 (naming some alternatives that governments may not have yet tried 
for securing better procedural due process). 
 225. See id. at 5 (“By way of temporary appearances, unbundling can avail pro se 
defendants of legal defenses they didn’t know they had. But unbundling is no panacea. It’s 
risky for lawyers to take on a limited representation role on short notice.”). 
 226. Siskind, supra note 159. 
 227. See Edelman, supra note 223, at 8–9 (referencing several viable options for 
altering the legal assistance available to parties in a contempt proceeding). 
 228. See Houseman, supra note 188, at 10–13 (explaining that there is a lack of 
resources and funding, which means that funds attributed to complying with Turner cannot 
then be used for instituting innovative and successfully vetted alternatives). 
 229. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011) (explaining that the four 
procedural safeguards are not the only alternatives suggested by the federal government). 
 230. See Zorza, supra note 222, at 259–62 (indicating that the court can take a more 
active role in moving cases forward). 
 231. See Richard Zorza, Courts in the 21st Century: The Access to Justice 
Transformation, 49 JUDGES’ J. 1, 4–7 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_atj_judges_journal
_wi10.authcheckdam.pdf (suggesting ways in which the courts can take a more active role in 
ensuring civil rights are protected through procedural due process). 
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this may inherently present a “preaching to the choir” problem, where those 
judges who are actively seeking the best practices probably already ensure 
that no one in their court is unjustly confined, while those judges who 
overlook procedure are unlikely to go out of their way to learn how to 
correctly apply more of it.232  Still, the suggestions remain helpful in that 
they highlight that both counsel and judges matter.233  Zorza’s solutions are 
viable, well-thought out, and capable of safeguarding due process.234 
C.  True Cost-Benefit Analysis 
While this may seem like the author is setting up a lengthy to-do list 
for the states, this Note can fortunately end on a positive note.  Spending on 
any of these procedural safeguards will not go to waste and will not only 
benefit the indigents.235  It has now repeatedly been shown that funding 
legal aid has a positive economic impact on the state as a whole.236  The 
Pennsylvania Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts (IOLTA) program, which 
is tasked with managing civil legal aid, just released a study which revealed 
that, for every dollar spent on legal aid, “$11 of quantifiable economic 
outcomes and savings were realized for all residents of the 
Commonwealth.”237  From the $53.6 million that was spent on the civil 
services programs in 2011, the State reaped $594 million in income and 
savings for Pennsylvanians, which in turn, supported 2,643 jobs for 
Pennsylvania workers.238  
This is not an anomaly.239  In 2009, Texas reported that for each dollar 
spent on providing indigent civil legal services, “the Texas economy gained 
                                                                                                     
 232. See id. at 5–6 (illustrating that these suggestions will be helpful only to the judges 
who take the time to read and institute them). 
 233. See id. (indicating that justices who take a more active role in the process can lead 
to a better and more efficient solution). 
 234. See id. (providing a detailed, workable, and comprehensive outline of several 
possible ways in which courts can take a more active role). 
 235. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 25–28 (indicating quantitatively the positive societal 
impacts that result when a government spends money on civil legal assistance for its indigent 
citizens). 
 236. See id. (citing numerous state studies indicating that provision of legal has a 
positive economic effect). 
 237. Rulli, supra note 187, at 25. 
 238. Rulli, supra note 187, at 27. 
 239. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 27–28 (revealing that the results of the Pennsylvania 
IOLTA program do not stand alone). 
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$7.42 in total spending, $3.56 in gross output and $2.20 in personal 
income.”240  Massachusetts recently affirmed that after spending $9.5 
million on legal aid, the state benefited to the tune of $53.2 million.241  In 
2010, the Florida Bar Foundation established that civil legal assistance 
created “more than 3,300 jobs, producing $250 million of output in the state 
economy and providing $297 million of disposable income.242  The Florida 
study concluded that for every dollar spent on legal aid, the state received 
an economic impact of $4.78.”243  In 2011, once again the nexus was 
affirmed, when New York found that such spending stirred $980 million in 
the overall economy, which, based on the state’s funding of the programs, 
created an almost five-to-one return for every dollar spent.244  
A University of Pennsylvania Law School professor who helped bring 
these studies to light, Louis S. Rulli, established his own caveat about 
them—it is possible that they overstate the economic impact of legal aid 
spending.245  Still, this stipulation seems to be added only to err on the side 
of a conservative reading of these studies because, in truth, the studies may 
instead be underevaluating state cost savings.246  Regardless, there is a clear 
economic benefit even if the numbers are not entirely accurate, and, 
additionally, Rulli mentions that such spending adds unquantifiable value:  
improving the poor’s view of the justice system and increasing the 
effectiveness of justice, respect, and fairness overall.247  One can argue that 
preventing unjust incarceration is priceless, and that the government must 
try to reformat all future Turner v. Rogers litigations regardless of cost.248  
These studies indicate that such an argument need not be made.249  It truly 
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 242. Rulli, supra note 187, at 27. 
 243. Rulli, supra note 187, at 27. 
 244. Rulli, supra note 187, at 27. 
 245. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 27 (claiming that the economic impact studies are not 
yet perfected; these are only preliminary reports). 
 246. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 27 (countering that there may actually be some 
unrealized cost savings not yet taken into consideration). 
 247. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 28 (“Financial benefits are certainly gained in each of 
these legal aid practice areas but, more importantly, vital interests are advanced that define 
the type of society we value.”). 
 248. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 28 (“In the final analysis, the relationship between 
ordinary citizens and their government is much more important to the long-term success of 
our democracy than any short-term economic gains.”). 
 249. See Rulli, supra note 187, at 25–27 (providing consistent, independent studies 
 
WHY TURNER V. ROGERS WAS AND WASN’T 209 
appears that reform will never be too expensive if the state can turn a profit 
five-fold—increasing access will just be seen as a wise investment.250  
Fortunately, then, even if Turner does not gets overturned in the near 
future, once states have a chance to examine such findings, they may feel 
confident to enact more significant, meaningful reform withal.251 
VIII.  Life After Turner 
The Circuit Courts appear to be citing Turner favorably.252  It is 
interesting to note, however, that at least one judge believes that the Turner 
outcome is dependent on the civil and criminal distinction.253  This is 
interesting because Justice Breyer did not explicitly state this as the main 
basis for the majority’s decision, but it appears that courts dabbling with 
civil Gideon may use this distinction as a takeaway from Turner 
nonetheless.254  Such a view also lends credibility to the above argument 
that Gompers was worth a closer examination by the justices.255  
Regardless, this interpretation of Turner should not be used because as 
stated by the lower court judges above in Pasqua and Krieger, such focus 
misses the point that counsel in the contempt setting seems dependent on 
the possibility of incarceration instead.256 
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In regards to the four mandated procedural safeguards, it is 
disconcertingly unclear how effective they will be.257  The Brennan Center 
for Justice’s amicus curiae brief includes a sobering revelation about how 
very frequently parents who truly cannot pay child support are jailed in 
Georgia.258  Unjust incarceration is a serious, reoccurring event, and the 
solution to it should not just be decided on a whim, hope, or prayer of the 
Court that it will work out.259  It is seemingly unlikely that the Court’s 
safeguards will add any meaningful due process protection.260  In Turner 
and other child support contempt cases, procedure was already in place.261 
It was just that some judges, like the one who Turner was before, simply 
decided not to abide by it.262  The four procedures will not now provide a 
meaningful additional layer of protection for Turner had they been 
mandated by the Supreme Court before 2006.263 
There are some who are more optimistic about the benefits of the 
decision, although they are still often guarded.264  One writer, pondering in 
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an ABA Journal article, reflected, “In the long run, the impact of the 
decision will be less about its language and more about its application at the 
state and local level.  It’s possible the world could be a better place in five 
to 10 years because of this decision.”265  A lawyer in Michigan concurred 
that the requirements could bring good change, but then admonished, “but 
this could all be a farce.”266  Rebekah Diller, Deputy Director of the Justice 
Program at the Brennan Center for Justice, presents a more realistic review 
of the Court’s new mandates, commenting that they create a “thorny set of 
implementation questions for the lower courts,” and while the procedures 
“may well provide sufficient safeguards in a select number of cases,” they 
are not “self-executing” and with a system already overworked and under 
supervised, these may truly not help the unrepresented at all.267 
Even though spectators seem less optimistic than the Turner majority 
was that the procedures are a panacea, hopefully the safeguards will provide 
some extra protection for child custody contemnors.268  Still, it would not be 
a good idea to rely on such to-date unfounded hope.269  As discussed by the 
majority in Pasqua v. Council, and by the dissent in Krieger v. 
Commonwealth, the nature of the contempt proceeding is more complicated 
than it may seem to be by an onlooker, and the safeguards have not altered 
any fundamental part of the proceeding.270  Thus, many of the same 
problems may assuredly arise, and at the end of the day few feel that 
fundamental justice is now assured.271 
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IV.  Conclusion 
Perhaps because of the narrow holding, the case of Turner v. Rogers 
was never given significant attention outside of the legal community.  Yet, 
as one can see from the state of pro se representation, criminal Gideon, and 
current procedural safeguards as a result of it, the case truly is newsworthy. 
Although the holding is explicitly narrow, the case sets strong 
precedent in the opposite direction of prior civil Gideon case law.  Justice 
Breyer’s reasoning seems built on the distinction between criminal and civil 
contempt, despite the Supreme Court having previously said that the focus 
should instead be on what procedure is required for “fundamental fairness” 
to be ensured. This faked ignorance of prior applications of law and 
jurisprudence, along with the majority’s silence on the practicality of civil 
Gideon, is relevant because although it was never admitted, the Turner v. 
Rogers decision may have been one that was based less on a due process 
concerns and instead was a forced finding to maintain the viability of the 
American legal justice system. 
Despite the limited holding, the Court engaged in discussion beyond 
the issue raised by the parties and mandated safeguards to the states, which 
are too unclear to be helpful or meaningful.  Instead of considering expert 
opinion about which due process protections would be most effective, the 
Court simply adopted the only suggestion available. Such a decision-
making process in any context is worrisome.  It is still too early to tell how 
the lower courts will use these mandated safeguards to change the legal 
protections available to litigants like Turner, but even a survey in the past 
year has not clarified how these procedures will add any more 
constitutional protection to child support contempt cases.  Fortunately, there 
is a wealth of other options available to states, and additionally, it appears 
that states will financially benefit from investing in such protections.  
Therefore, while the Supreme Court’s decision in Turner may not have the 
best answer to legal sagas that countless Americans face every day, the 
decision is best seen not as a roadblock or a conclusion to these stories, but 
rather one that can inspire fresh discussion and action for “fundamental 
justice” nonetheless. 
